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Abstract 
The aim with this study is to find out how prison officers in Gothenburg are identifying 
violent extremism and radicalisation. The method used to find information regarding this was 
interviews performed with thirteen prison officers who have recently finished the basic 
training programme. The interviews lasted approximately 30 to 40 minutes each, and were 
performed during two different periods when the basic training programme educated the 
prison officers in radicalisation and violent extremism. The theoretical framework used to 
extract information is made by Moscovici, and involves categorisation and social 
representation. The interviews have been analysed through discursive analysis, which helped 
the study to gain depth and an interesting angle of approach. The findings on the first research 
question show approximately half of the prison officers felt they did not learn anything from 
the lecture, and the other half are positive towards the content of the lecture. The findings on 
the second research question show eleven prison officers cannot identify a violent extremist 
person from looks and appearance, meanwhile two prison officers mean they are able to 
identify them. This gives the education and the lecture about violent extremism and 
radicalisation credibility and should mean positive response.  
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1. Introduction 
The city of Gothenburg has become a base for young people who leave Sweden to take part in 
violence in war-torn countries (Smith 2016). This has been the case since the start of the 
Syrian war in 2012, and while the travels still occur, there seems to be a decline in the amount 
of people taking these decisions (Smederöd 2016). Some parts of Gothenburg have been 
reported to have a higher amount of people connected to violent extremism than others, which 
often is blamed on poor integration and economic or social exclusion. There have occurred 
travels from segregated areas and areas of low socio-economic statuses, but violent extremism 
and radicalisation is not connected to poverty, according to some researchers (Ranstorp, 
Gustafsson & Hyllengren 2015). The problem is neither arising from the poorest countries in 
the world, nor from the poorest people in Sweden. “The connection between poverty and 
terrorism is very weak” (Ibid 2015:16), even if there are contradictory reports (UNDP 2017).  
 
Violent extremism and terrorism are serious problems in the global world today, and 
governments are forced to increase their knowledge about and resources for working against 
terror. The increased focus on violent extremism and radicalisation is relevant in a European 
perspective due to the spread both in Europe, but also globally.  
 
“Prisons are considered to be high risk environments where violent extremism is growing 
rapidly” (Kriminalvården 2015:3), therefore the Swedish prison and probation services have 
received a mission by the Swedish government (Kriminalvården 2016) to develop their work 
against violent extremism. The mission includes educating prison officers and thereby 
restricting the number of radicalisations happening in Swedish prisons to a low level. To be 
successful with the mission, the Swedish prison and probation services are requested by the 
Swedish government to educate their prison officers in the matter. 
 
The authority judge factors like e.g. an increased amount of swedes affiliated with 
foreign terror groups, stricter criminal law regulations, and an increased movement in 
the right- and left wing extremist environments raise the probability of higher amounts 
of clients with connections to violent extremism…  
…To achieve this, the Swedish prison and probation services stress the necessity of 
authority staff acquiring additional knowledge and understanding of violent extremism. 
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The Swedish prison and probation services therefore raise the need of developing and 
implementing educational efforts for the staff as an urgent measure. (Kriminalvården 
(2016:2, own translation). 
 
The Swedish prison and probation service offer a basic training programme for their staff, 
which after completion gives the staff a position as prison officer. The basic training 
programme is an education consisting of all knowledge possible when working with clients, 
and means 100 percent full time studying. The basic training programme stretches over 20 
weeks and excludes participants from work during the ongoing education, but includes 
workplace practice. The basic training programme includes preparation for different situations 
possible to occur when in contact with clients, and gives the prison officers a broad spectrum 
of knowledge to handle potential settings. One aspect of the education is violent extremism 
and radicalisation, and in Gothenburg this particular regard is given a 90 minutes long lecture.  
 
This study and thesis is based on an investigation of how prison officers perceive and talk 
about the lecture on violent extremism and radicalisation, which the author also participated 
in. The lecture is a fairly new aspect of the basic training programme, and the first group of 
prison officers were introduced to the lecture in Gothenburg in March 2017. Since the lecture 
had only been part of the basic training programme for a couple of months when this study 
was finished, there is a clear research gap regarding what the prison officers brought from the 
education.  
 
This study is focused on finding out what the prison officers, who have finished the basic 
training programme, learned from the lecture about violent extremism, but also to learn more 
of what their understanding of this subject is overall. There could after all be a large 
difference between what is taught and what is learned. This study is relevant to society 
because it can show if prison officers use stereotypes and preconceived notions to identify 
violent extremists and radicalised persons. This would be a problem because the motto of the 
Swedish prison and probation service is “we will break the vicious circle”, suggesting 
stopping vicious behaviour leading back to imprisonment, and this means that prison officers 
need an open mind and give judge free support. The increasing media coverage of extremist 
crimes and the fact that according to estimates (Kriminalvården 2015), violent extremists and 
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people in the risk of becoming radicalised in prisons as well as out in the society are likely to 
increase, this study has a high social relevance.  
 
A newly appointed position created in 2014, The National Coordinator to Saveguard 
Democracy against Violent Extremism (furthermore referred to as the Coordinator), is part of 
a governmental united front to fight violent extremism in Sweden. The Coordinator works to 
develop a strategy to diminish violent extremism in different dimensions; promotion and 
prevention. The Coordinator has informed ‘front line staff’, which often is municipal 
managers, about violent extremism and radicalised persons (The National Coordinator to 
Saveguard Democracy against Violent Extremism 2016). The Coordinator includes the 
strategy of educating prison officers, but the plan on how to educate them has not been found. 
The Coordinator has made about 200 educational visits to different front line staff, around 
Sweden. This was thereby motivated by the mission to educate front line staff so that they, in 
turn, can spread their knowledge on to their colleagues (Statens offentliga utredningar 2016: 
26).  
 
 
1.1 Aim  
This thesis focuses on the prison and probation services’ commitment to the Swedish 
government to educate prison officers in how to handle and prevent radicalisation and violent 
extremism in prisons. The aim of this study is to find out how prison officers experience the 
education regarding violent extremism, and how they identify violent extremists and 
radicalised persons. To find information regarding how prison officers are perceiving persons 
who are violent extremists or radicalised, thirteen interviews have been made and recorded. 
The prison officers have been questioned about their views of violent extremists and 
radicalised people, and the interviews have been analysed and theoretical frameworks have 
been applied.   
 
 
1.2 Research questions 
These are the research questions used to find the answer to the aim: 
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1. What did the prison officers know before and what did they learn about radicalisation 
and violent extremism when participating in the education?  
2. How do prison officers identify violent extremist and radicalised persons?  
 
The first question focuses on answering the level of knowledge that the prison officers had 
before the education, and to explore what they consider they have learned. Question number 
two can demonstrate if prison officers have any preconceived notions about violent extremists 
and radicalised persons, and focuses on finding what those stereotypes and preconditions 
might be. This is interesting because it can show how prison officers are categorising and 
stereotyping violent extremists and radicalised persons. Preconceived notions are something 
that most people are carrying, but because of the sensitivity of this profession it is important 
not to let it affect the way clients are treated.  
 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis will continue as follows. The first chapter after this introduction is the background 
where a presentation of the problem will be given, followed by a discussion about 
terminology, relevance and delimitations continue through to the next chapter. Chapter 
number three focuses on previous research where the most important studies in the field of 
violent extremism and radicalisation are presented. The previous research chapter also include 
some studies on how prison officers have been educated and informed in different aspects 
before. Next chapter following is the theoretical framework where theories of stereotypes and 
categorisation are explained for and discussed about. Chapter number five is research design, 
methodology and concepts, including a detailed presentation of how the interviews have been 
performed, what the interesting material consist of and how the methodology of discursive 
analysis has been applied. The same chapter also include a part of validity and reliability, and 
one part discussing the ethics regarding the problematics of performing interviews. Chapter 
number six is a comprehensive chapter of the analysis and results, which is where the study is 
presented and where the theoretical framework and methodology is used. Finally, chapter 
seven presents the conclusions made and a discussion regarding what was found, but also 
what there should be made further studies on. Ending this thesis is a reference list and an 
appendix of the interview questions given to the interviewees.  
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2. Background 
This chapter provides a presentation of the problem of violent extremism and continues with 
clarifications of the frequently used terms and concepts in this research field. Thereafter 
follows a section of relevance where it is stated why this study is important to European 
studies, and then a discussion on delimitations, and where the limits of this study have landed.  
 
 
2.1 Presentation of the problem 
Since the terrorist group Al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, the 
discussion regarding Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism entered the global scene 
(Furubrant & Norman 2009). The European Union saw the attack as a cause of the Palestinian 
conflict, the slow progressions in the developing world, and the inhibition of the Middle East, 
and did not believe it would involve Europe in a larger extent. This followed by the British 
‘shoe-bomber’ and a killing of a nationalist populist politician in the Netherlands, but even 
though the European Union had assigned for a programme for counterterrorism cooperation 
after the World Trade Centre attack, not much happened at European Union level (Bossong 
2014). It did not take long before there was an attack in Europe which the terrorist group Al-
Qaeda took responsibility for. In 2004 the first large terror attack coupled with radicalised 
Islam took place in Europe, this time in Madrid’s commuting system, killing almost 200 
people (History.com 2010). This was a new type of attack where civilians were the main 
target, which the European Council recognised and therefore a new political channel of the 
European Union counterterrorism policy was introduced. The European Commission 
published an extensive communication on the European Union counterterrorism policy in 
2004, listing a range of areas where increased empathy needed to be placed. The term ‘violent 
radicalisation’ was coined in the communication, which made an important statement that 
‘radicalisation’ without the word ‘violent’ in it does not necessarily mean terrorism (Bossong 
2014).  
 
Following the attacks in Madrid, the bombings in London occurred in 2005, causing 
international terrorism to become a global threat and an issue for every national authority to 
deal with (Furubrant & Norman 2009). Globally, the amount of prisoners of all kinds is 
increasing (Goulding, Hall & Steels 2008) meanwhile there is also an increasing development 
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of people becoming radicalised (Noori 2016). Prison and probation services in Europe have 
discovered a number of people who are becoming radicalised during their time in prison. This 
occurs when they get in contact with people who already are or currently developing into 
becoming radicalised, but the Swedish prison and probation services do not see this as a big 
issue (Kriminalvården 2016). Nevertheless, prisons in Sweden are still seen as “high-risk-
environment” for people to develop into radicalisation and violent extremism 
(Kriminalvården 2015). These two factors are contradicting to each other but are coming from 
the same source, namely the Swedish prison and probation services.  
 
A number of people who have been part of the performance of the latest terrorist attacks have 
been radicalised during their time spent in prison, among them the people performing the 
Paris attacks 2015 and also the people responsible for the Brussels murders in 2014 (Hellmuth 
2015: 989-990). The French prison officers have been educated and trained on how to 
discover radicalisation among their prisoners, but not how to deal with it (Hellmuth 2015: 
990). One solution has been to isolate radicalised prisoners from the others completely, 
having all activities and time isolated from the rest of the prisoners, even though this demands 
the radicalisation to be discovered in time before it is spread onward (Hellmuth 2015: 989). In 
Germany there are similar problems with radicalisation during time spent in prison (Hellmuth 
2016: 42). Also Italy is reporting about the issues of having prisoners becoming radicalised 
during their time spent in prison, and how difficult it is to discover (Björkman 2010: 240).  
 
The Swedish prison and probation services has received a mission by the Swedish 
government to firstly, map out what the current situation looks like regarding violent 
extremism and radicalisation, and secondly, to create an assessment of how the mission is 
developing. This first part of the mission was to develop work procedures, to educate the 
prison officers in a secure and accurate way, and the second part of the mission was to fulfil 
those requirements in order to fight the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism in 
prisons. The mission was initially in place by the government in 2015, to cover radicalisation 
towards violent extremism of clients in the prisons in Sweden. The mission also covers clients 
that are already affiliated, or has any kind of connection to groups of violent extremism, and it 
includes right-, left- and Islamic extremism (Kriminalvården 2015). The statement points out 
the crucial situation and the seriousness of it, and the importance of a collective effort both 
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nationally but also in Europe to be able to stop the radicalisation from growing in prisons. The 
Swedish prison and probation services are mirroring the society in general, events in the 
surrounding world affect the work that is being done with the clients, and the clients are also 
being affected. A risk with having violent extremists in prisons is that they are meeting each 
other, and therefore can create a stronger belief in their mission to spread radicalisation to 
other clients (Kriminalvården 2015).  
 
The first group of prison officers in Sweden trained to discover and find clues that could 
connect clients to radicalisation or violent extremism, started their education in March 2017 in 
Gothenburg. The lecture of the subject was 90 minutes long and the dynamic and current 
material that they are covering includes terminology, indicators, possible background factors, 
what the governmental decisions mean, and what the circumstances are for the prison officers. 
The target group that the prison officers learn to be more attentive to when looking for signs 
of violent extremism and radicalisation is listed in the statements below.  
 
Persons who are considered being close, or being included in Islamic violent extremist 
environments, including those considered vulnerable receivers have an average age of 
36 years. Approximately 75 percent of those have done sentences before. Clients who 
are associated with the political extremist environment have an average age of nearly 30 
years. Everyone who is considered being connected to the right-wing extremist 
environment has previous sentences compared to approximately half of the persons 
connected to the left-wing extremist environment. (Kriminalvården 2015:7, own 
translation).  
 
The amount of women involved in violent extremism is fractional, but is expected to rise due 
to the increased amount of women traveling to align with terror organisations, hence more 
women are returning to Sweden (Kriminalvården 2015). Science is showing that risk factors 
like overpopulation, assaults of prisoners, abuse of power by prison officers, and threats and 
violence among prisoners are the biggest reasons for the increasing radicalisation of prisons 
today, which is why “prisons are occasionally described as high risk environments where 
violent extremism is growing fast” (Kriminalvården 2015:3).  
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The goals that have been installed for the Swedish prison and probation services 
(Kriminalvården 2015:3) by the government in the area of radicalisation and violent 
extremism are:  
 
 Prevent and avert clients to become radicalised. 
 Contribute to lower the threat of terror and protect the society from harmful events.  
 Through the spread of knowledge and education of prison officers and policy makers 
find an increased understanding for, and knowledge about, violent extremist 
environments.  
 Work with adequate relapse prevention for the target group, where treatment efforts 
are based on scientific research. 
 Work by a distinct structure for the authority’s external collaboration regarding the 
target group, in relation with other authorities, communes and country councils, as 
well as civilian actors and organisations.  
 Document and follow up the authority’s work against violent extremism.  
 
 
2.2 Terminology 
Extremism, radicalisation, radicalised persons and violent extremism are all terms with 
complicated associations. Explanations of how the terms are used in this paper follow below. 
 
Extremism as a concept is, according to Carlsson, used by researchers to identify groups of 
people that are considered to be on extreme sides of political or religious spectrums 
(2016:12). The Swedish security police is using the concept extremism as an assembling of 
movements, ideologies or people whom does not accept democracy in society, which 
sometimes is acted out through violence, in order to influence the society in the wanted 
direction (Säkerhetspolisen 2010:27).  
 
Violent extremism is a concept that is frequently discussed, but difficult to define. The 
concept is defined by Carlsson (2016:12), namely that a person is more or less supporting, 
requesting or participating in violent action based on ideological beliefs:  
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It is also a question of what is considered as violence. The concept is rarely specified 
neither in the science field in Swedish nor foreign studies, but it is significant to hold a 
short discussion about it. Sociologically violence often means an action of aggression 
where a person or group intentionally add, or tries to achieve someone or something 
damage.  (Carlsson 2016:13, own translation).  
 
It is the supporting, requesting and participating parts that are the problematic factors seen 
from a societal point of view, not the extreme opinions alone. In fact, the extreme opinions 
often form the society in positive directions, if they are expressed but not taken into action. 
The definition of violent extremism is including many different groups with shifting agendas, 
and a variety of violence (2016:13). Violence can imply a range of different actions and is 
categorised by the context where it happens. The concept violent extremism occurs when the 
society chooses to define groups of actions as supporting of, requesting, or participating in 
violence or other problematical actions (2016:13).  
 
The actions of supporting, requesting, and participating in violent extremism have two 
separate meanings according to the Swedish security police. The first meaning is an action 
which can be seen as threatening to security, as supporting or participating in violence which 
is according to the radicalised reinforced by ideology, religion or political views. The second 
meaning is actions that are not supporting, requesting, or participating in violent extremism, 
but are problematic in other ways (Säkerhetspolisen 2010: 26). Naturally, only the first 
meaning will be considered here since the second meaning does not involve the criteria for 
the concept used in this study. The concept of supporting, requesting, or participating in 
violence could take form either in material of some sort, like a film or a speech, or it can take 
the form of a person’s behaviour. A person is according to the Swedish security police 
considered supporting, requesting, or participating in violence when he or she repeatedly is 
showing support or partaking in violence in the name of ideology (Säkerhetspolisen 2010: 
27). Violent extremism can also be defined as individuals or groups who are supporting or 
taking part of violent actions to achieve certain political changes (Herz 2016).  
 
Radicalisation can be described as a “development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support 
of any group or cause in conflict” (McCauley & Moskalenko 2011:4). Another way to 
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describe the term is “the process by which individuals (or groups) change their beliefs, adopt 
and extremist viewpoint and advocate (or practice) violence to achieve their goals” (Porter & 
Kebbell 2011:213). There are authors suggesting that there is no such thing as radicalisation, 
that it is just a phenomenon that can be compared to a virus that is spreading online 
(Neumann 2013). Most researchers agree on the assumption that radicalisation is a process 
leading towards becoming violent extremist, and that being radicalised is a converting step 
that transforms the person into the end goal of extremism. However, the concept of 
radicalisation divides researchers; it can illustrate political ideas which are not accepted by the 
general society, due to norms and principles. This can be portrayed in Western European 
societies as religion, ideologies which deny human rights, or racial supremacy. Radicalisation 
can also be depicted as the process when the radicalised person seek to gain political or 
religious power by diminishing other people’s human rights and freedoms (Neumann 2013). 
Radicalisation has mostly been connected to Islamic violent extremism, and this is according 
to Kundnani (2014) because people and mainly scientists, need an explanation to why 
radicalisation only occurs to people who have an extremist view of what Islam means. 
Kundnani means that without discovering the real roots of violent extremism it is easy to 
blame other things that could have caused the problem, but did not. To blame radicalisation is 
an ‘easy way out’ instead of taking responsibility and deal with the core issues, which 
Kundnani means are the infinite losses of families and friends due to the irresponsible way the 
United States of America answered the Al-Qaeda attacks in 2001. What becomes obvious 
from reading about the definition of radicalisation is that there is no clear answer to what it 
stands for, only that the radicalised person is undergoing a process of becoming more 
convinced in the cause of extremism.  
 
A radicalised person can be defined as someone who is influenced by a ‘radicaliser’, who is a 
manipulative and charismatic person who actively tries to affect targeted and vulnerable 
persons. This process of radicalisation is mostly performed individually, and occasionally in 
small groups (Khosrokhavar 2013). A radicalised person has been going through a 
recruitment process introduced by a radicaliser (Carlsson 2016).  
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2.3 Relevance 
Radicalisation and violent extremism is constantly rising, and it seems as there are frequently 
news regarding terrorist attacks and racist acts all over the European Union and Europe. 
Gothenburg is one of the many cities in Europe where people are collectively deciding to 
perform or support terrorist attacks, both in Europe and globally. This creates fear and 
suspicion among people in societies affected by the attacks. In this thesis there are two 
different types of extremism, namely political and religious. Political extremism is in this 
study portrayed as left and right wing extremism, and the two groups have many similarities 
at its core. Anti-democratic ideas is one of the most important thoughts that illustrates the 
political extremism (Korsell 2009), and that is also one of the most important reasons why it 
needs to be contained. Religious extremism includes Islamic extremism, which is the type that 
has received most attention in media during the latest years. To be able to contain the spread 
of political and religious extremism inside prisons, one important step is to maintain the 
democratic process which is unwanted for the existence of extremism. 
 
This study is relevant to the field of European studies due to the spread of radicalisation and 
violent extremism through Europe, and because it is affecting everyone living on the 
European continent. The field of violent extremism is growing larger in Sweden and Europe 
and the subject of keeping citizens safe is often problematized in relation to the current terror 
threats and violent extremism. The issue has turned into a favourite topic for politicians who 
either are playing on people’s fear of terror, or begging people to be more open minded. How 
to contain violent extremism has become a huge field where it is of great importance to 
expand the research and to engage as many factors as possible, where the prison and 
probation services plays an important role. An easy way would be to lock violent extremists 
up for life, but it is important to be critical to these fast solutions because they are only 
solving the current issue. It is a difficult and important problem to solve.  
 
To hinder the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism it is important to ensure that the 
prison and probation services are doing what they can to minimise a growing support for 
extremist movements. Fear creates anger and it can build walls between people, which are the 
least needed in the society of Gothenburg today. If the prison and probation services can offer 
their prison officers a sufficient knowledge regarding the appearance and spread of 
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radicalisation and violent extremism, it could mean that the spread can be hindered and 
maybe even stopped. The urgency of stopping the spread of radicalisation and violent 
extremism cannot be clearer.  
 
 
2.4 Delimitations 
This study does not engage in what extent there is people in prisons available to 
radicalisation, neither the cause of violent extremism and radicalisation. The prison officers 
have all chosen to remain anonymous throughout the interviews, which make the probability 
to lie during the interviews rather small, because firstly, no one else knows they participated, 
and secondly, there is no incentives to lie since the questions regards the basic training 
programme and are therefore not personal. The prison officers have all been selected to 
participate in the basic training programme financed by the state, and after finishing the basic 
training programme they will be able to work as a prison officer with permanent employment.  
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3. Background and previous research 
Prison officers is an occupation with a long history, and in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the 
need for staff took a turn from only needing to be big and strong, to be more enlightened 
about the lives that prisoners have lead. The training for the staff at that time was taken 
seriously in England where a report has been performed by Johnston (2008) regarding the 
training of prison officers. The prison officers were exhorted to be a ‘moral influence’ over 
the prisoners by practicing their tasks accurately but without being harsh. An act of 
responsiveness and morally correct behaviour by the prison officers were thought to guide the 
prisoners to adjust to a more respected and honest lifestyle. The prison officers were supposed 
to be acknowledging this when dealing with prisoners, and behaving representable around the 
prisoners – that they are always an object of moral example (Johnston 2008: 300). General 
training schools for prison officers opened up in England in the late 1800s and in a report 
performed by Gladstone committee they wanted the lectures in the training schools to be 
performed by experts in the area of criminal anthropology. The committee agreed on that the 
training should contain ‘firmness, intelligence, and probity’. The prison officers should be 
informed about their obligations and have knowledge about what they are implied to do in 
situations that occur in prisons (Ibid: 304). The prison officers also had to study in their spare 
time, and pass the written exams that were held in order to test their knowledge, and to 
confirm the training gave results (Ibid: 306). One major that participated in the training 
reported to the committee that he acknowledged the ‘human and personal’ side of the work as 
prison officer during his time at the training school, and that it brought him ‘the curious and 
unexpected problems’ that occur daily in a prison (Ibid: 307). At this time there was no 
training in finding violent extremism or any kind of care for the prisoners, only to keep them 
locked in and busy, and to influence them with morality and honesty.  
 
One of the complicated parts of studying the subject of radicalisation and violent extremism 
has been to find the fact-based previous research on an issue that is always current. The 
research that has been used here is mainly studies that have shown up when searching in 
library catalogues e.g. GUNDA and LIBRIS for Gothenburg university- and national studies, 
but also studies that have appeared when searching in Google Scholar to have international 
studies interlocked as well. The search phrases used are ‘radicalisation education’ and 
‘training prison officers’ and similar wordings.  
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Research in the field of radicalisation and violent extremism has mainly been focusing on 
what the causes of it could be and what contributes to a larger likelihood for a person to 
emphasise with these radical thoughts. There are much emphasis on the beginning of 
terrorism and how it has spread all over the world today, and few studies are enlightening the 
work being done to prevent the spread of radicalisation and violent extremism in prisons. 
Since the phenomenon is relatively new (as in how it is portrayed today) there have been few 
studies on the work to prevent prisons from being breeding grounds for radicalisation and 
violent extremism.  
 
Comparative research performed on prison and probation services in Denmark and Sweden 
show that there are many similarities between the countries. In Denmark there have been 
educational courses for all newly employed prison officers to prevent radicalisation and 
extremism where the employees are trained to identify signs. There are also suggestions that 
there should be additional training for the prison officers, since it seems to be a particular 
problem within prisons, and they are now hiring prison officers from a larger range of cultures 
and social backgrounds to make the understanding for other people’s situations wider, and 
increase the competence within the prison and probation services in Denmark (Christiansen 
2017: 31). In Swedish prison and probation services there is a claim of lack of knowledge on 
how to educate prison officers on radicalisation most efficiently. It seems like Swedish prison 
and probation services cannot make up their mind on how to educate their prison officers in 
this matter, since there are a couple of different programmes and alternatives on instruments 
that can be used. The problem for the Swedish side seems to be the requirement of knowledge 
and experience to attempt to find radicalisation signs (Christiansen 2017: 32). Unfortunately 
there is not much research on this topic in Sweden, since the prison and probation services are 
a difficult place to collect information from, and both the prisoners and the prison officers are 
often quite moderate about critique. This is an ethical problem because the authority of prison 
and probation services in Sweden “serves as both a gatekeeper and primary sponsor for the 
research” which means the authority can steer what is published (Christiansen 2017: 38). 
 
Britain also has a Prevent programme, focusing on “education and community engagement-
based policy approach to terrorism prevention” which has affected other countries in Europe. 
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Prevent was produced as an effect of the bombings in London 2005, where terrorists attacked 
the public transport system of London during rush hour. The programme contains sections 
where several authorities and institutions acquire different types of activities, e.g. the 
prisoners received direct educational programmes. The police received the most extensive 
activity, with more than 300 police posts between 2008 and 2011 dedicated on the prevent 
programme, split between different levels of police posts. There are different voices being 
heard claiming the programme a failure due to the focus being put on population of Muslim 
beliefs. This has raised walls between the Muslim community and the police’s desire to 
supervise and control the moves of these communities’ actions. (Thomas 2015: 171-172).  
 
To educate and train prison officers to discover and report any suspicion of radicalisation is 
crucial in order to stop the radicalisation happening in prisons. In an extensive study 
performed by Useem and Clayton (2009), prisons in the United States of America motivate 
their prison officers to ‘listen for and observe signs of radicalization’, and they are told to 
report to their superiors any suspicious actions that are observed. Most of the staff 
interviewed were aware of the issue of radicalisation, but could not express the signs that they 
are looking for and listening after (Useem & Clayton 2009: 580). Prison officers in the United 
States of American prisons are told to be attentive of deviant and unusual behaviour, but what 
is defined as ‘deviant behaviour’ is not clear which adds more responsibility to identifying 
behaviours and analysing them. In the end, the prison officers are exhorted to report 
behaviour rather than wait for the process to proceed (Useem & Clayton 2009: 567).  
 
Other researchers (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora 2012) in the United States of America have 
studied the lacking knowledge on how to treat Muslim prisoners. The study investigates the 
prison officers’ ability to adjust and understand the needs of Muslim prisoners, as well as 
being educated about different religions (but with a direct focus on Islam). The prison officers 
in United States of America are trained on how to identify signs of radicalisation, but also the 
religions requirements that most Muslims hold, in order to make the prison officers more 
sensitive to special demands. Even though this kind of effort to train prison officers is 
supported by the Bureau of Prisons most states do not have programmes of this sort to educate 
their prison officers (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora 2012: 450). The training is mostly 
regarding finding the signs of radicalisation, rather than understanding the religion, which is 
16 
 
directly opposing to what the Office of Inspector General was warning about; more 
knowledge of Islam enables to possibilities to discover messages of radicalisation. It is 
important for the country to develop a coordinated strategy to train and support prison officers 
to view the imprisoned Muslims as individuals rather than as an isolated and troubled group, 
otherwise the prison experience will be more likely to enhance rather than oppress 
radicalisation and extremism (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora 2012: 451). 
 
Khosrokhavar (2013) has done studies on French prisoners and their potential connection to 
radicalisation. He performed interviews with both prisoners and prison officers, which makes 
his study of great importance in the area of violent extremism and radicalisation. 
Unfortunately there were no training for the majority of the prison officers (at least not at that 
time), but there were a low number of prison officers who were assigned to monitor and 
handle the spread of radicalisation in prisons in France. Those who were assigned this task 
were sometimes also doing other duties, which decreased the chances of detecting 
radicalisation even more (Khosrokhavar 2013). The prison officers were sometimes given a 
two-week introduction course where they were accompanied by experienced prison officers 
showing them the basic knowledge about the work, but this often did not make the new prison 
officers certain of the job, which in turn created uncertainty among the prison officers. This 
uncertainty may have led to a build-up of misunderstandings and preconceptions regarding 
radicalisation, hence more prejudices are created among the prison officers (Khosrokhavar 
2013).  
 
A study made by Jones highlights the importance for prison officers to be educated in areas 
like violent extremism and radicalisation, in order to be less suspicious towards clients. The 
study shows that Muslim clients have been poorly treated both by other clients but also by 
prison officers, and little attention is given to differentiate between Muslim clients and 
Islamic extremists. Instead, all Muslim clients have been treated with suspicion by prison 
officers in the study (2014:96). This proves that more education is needed and the subject 
must be treated seriously, meanwhile less emphasis is needed on detecting radicalised persons 
since the number of detected cases so far is low. This may seem contradictory since 
information regarding prisons being great breeding grounds for extremism is constant, and 
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also true. The discussion regarding “prisons being schools for terrorism” is one-sided 
according to Jones (2014:75).  
 
To summarise the findings of previous research, there need to be more research in this area 
because currently it is difficult to find relevant research connected to the issue. The previous 
research started out with a comparative study between Sweden and Denmark, and how the 
two countries are trying to solve the issue of radicalisation in prisons. Denmark seems to have 
won that fight since Sweden unfortunately has not gotten a concrete solution to the 
educational problem yet, according Christiansen (2017). Another study is performed by 
Johnston (2008) and he describes the evolution of prison officers through time, but more 
importantly the importance of being able to see the individual in prisoners as a prison officer 
today, since it can be easy to create preconceptions and judge by group belonging instead. 
Thomas (2015) has created research on how the desire to supervise can create wedges 
between people and destroy relations between communities. Useem and Clayton (2009) have 
done research on what prison officers learned from a lecture about radicalisation and violent 
extremism and it displayed that they are taught to constantly look for signs, but this created a 
miscommunication between the different groups of people. Rappaport, Veldhuis and Guiora 
(2015) have done a study on how prison officers are trained to reduce the radicalisation in 
prisons. The findings were that prison officers were taught to look for signs of radicalisation, 
which could be anything that according to the prison officer seems strange. The study showed 
that they all needed more education on what different religions means, which could reduce the 
suspicion between groups and increase the understanding between one and other. 
Khosrokhavar (2013) has made a study where some of the prison officers were educated in 
the issue and some were not, and a couple of the prison officers were assigned to monitor and 
handle the spread of radicalisation. This seemed to be a poor model because there were few 
prison officers with knowledge of how to handle the situations emerging. Meanwhile, prison 
officers were also often assigned other side-missions as well, which means they might have 
been unfocused whilst stationed to analyse the place. Last was Jones (2014) who made a 
study that showed Muslim clients are being poorly treated in prisons, because of prison 
officers’ suspicion. As the previous research is telling us; more research is needed in 
educating and evaluating what is taught about radicalisation and violent extremism.  
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4. Theoretical framework 
Following there will be a statement about the theoretical framework and how it has been used 
to match the study of educating staff about radicalisation and violent extremism.  
 
4.1 Categorisation & social representation  
 
Categorisation is often used to help understand how to relate and behave, and it occurs 
subconsciously for most people. People use categorisation of other people when they need 
either to make a connection or to distance themselves from a person or a group, but it is also 
utilised when positioning a person or a group in relation to ourselves. Categorisation can also 
be used to form an opinion regarding a person or a group (Mäkitalo 2012) e.g. “he is a 
motorcycle type” or “they behave like high school girls”, which creates preconceptions about 
persons or groups before meeting them. Accordingly, we can create a categorisation of 
ourselves e.g. by wearing a certain style of clothes or represent a sports team etc. Moscovici 
(2010) writes that categorisation is built on memories created by ourselves or by someone 
else, and connections created with either positive or negative emotions. Ragazzi discusses the 
negative sides of categorisation (2017), and means that concepts of different sort justify signs 
which indicate e.g. radicalisation. Categorisation in this perspective can, therefore, be a hinder 
because it may cut off persons of interest, meanwhile include those who fit the category 
instead of being a guide toward finding those on the verge to radicalisation. Mäkitalo (2012) 
suggest that categories given by an institution or authority may be of more importance, or as 
in this case, be of more concern because they influence more people. This is another reason 
why it is important to educate the prison officers on the topic of violent extremism and 
radicalisation; because the Swedish prison and probation services has a responsibility towards 
society to develop an environment for the clients to all be treated equally without exceptions.  
 
Social representation is, according to its founder Moscovici; “a system of values, ideas and 
practices with a twofold function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to 
orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to 
enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them 
with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the 
various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.” (1976: xiii). Any small 
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task performed in the society would become a problem without the references of 
representations and could be perceived as walking around without the means to communicate 
with the surrounding society, according to Moscovici. He continues to explain the meaning 
and importance of representations; the world would be apprehended as if there was a new 
language, culture and social codes everyday which would make the environment for anyone 
unbearable (Moscovici 2000).  
 
Johansson and Lalander (2010) describe representations as a way to make the world familiar, 
which is performed through anchoring. Anchoring means to identify something and then 
categorise it according to what is most appropriate. Social representations are created in 
relation to others, and as Moscovici express it: “Representations, obviously, are not created by 
individuals in isolation” (2000:27). Once they have been created they emerge into living and 
changing phenomena, evolving in contact with other people’s experiences and discoveries.  
 
Representations are always influenced by previously learned experiences, and are also 
affected by our culture and language (Moscovici 2000). This means that we are always 
subconsciously comparing people we meet with our preconceived knowledge gained by 
previous encounters, acknowledging the tiniest sign of a familiar notion to be able to put 
people into categories and establish an approach to them. To recognise and identify a shirt of 
your favourite hockey team on a stranger makes you categorise differently compared to if that 
same stranger would wear a team shirt of the greatest rival team. Moscovici further claims 
social representation to be both intellectual and figurative (2011), explained as having a 
thought of a person or group and apply it on to reality creating the featuring attributes 
immediate. The group itself is not considered to be moulded by the environment, but rather 
the group is shaped from within by the expectations and preconditions applied on it. The 
social representation of different groups and people within these groups are shaped by a 
society that classifies its members after class, categories, ethnicity, sex etc. Meanwhile society 
divides its members by majorities and minorities, and people’s beliefs of either religious or 
political are also categorised by society. As a result these representations of groups are 
synonymous for the individuals within them even if none of the attributes are true for the 
individual (Moscovici 2011).  
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Moscovici summarises the meaning of representation in one sentence: “the purpose of all 
representations is to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” (2000:37). 
This is replicated in Johansson and Lalander where they draw the conclusion that nightmares 
are classified as ‘dream’ as soon as we awake from one to be able to process it and separate 
from reality (2010:79).  
 
The concepts of categorisation and representation are interesting to use in this thesis due to 
the importance of not being judgemental as prison officer. In the role of prison officer, it is 
particularly important to not judge clients and their past and history does not matter in the role 
of recovery. Some of the interview questions are focused on how the interviewees identify 
violent extremists and radicalised persons, which, depending on what the prison officers’ 
answer, could suggest that preconceived notions and stereotypes shines through.  
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5. Research design, methodology and concepts 
In this chapter the methods used for finding answers for this study is explained and discussed. 
For this study the method used has been interviews, and for analysing the answers given 
discursive analysis has been used. There is also a part where the material (interviews) are 
explained and discussed for. Lastly, there is a part where the validity and reliability for the 
study are reasoned for.  
 
 
5.1 Interviews as method 
The method for this study is qualitative interviews due to the ability to get the most expressive 
answers to the questions that will be asked (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 47). The interviews 
performed have the character of respondent interviews since the interviewees are the study 
objects in this research. By conducting respondent interviews will be an accurate way to let 
me explain the questions fully and ask for clarification when needed. To make respondent 
interviews mean that the interesting parts is not the facts, but how the interviewee perceive the 
reality and the different situations (Ibid: 47). The answers for the questions asked to 
respondent interviews say little about the reality, but much about how the reality is perceived. 
The interviews were organised in a semi-structured way, meaning that there are some fixed 
questions but also some degree of flexibility. When conducting interviews, it is important to 
realise that there are different kinds of interviewees, some need more questions and some 
need fewer, which is why semi-structured interviews are a great way to work around the 
possible issue of not getting enough material. The adaptability of semi-structured interviews 
also brings the possibility to change orders of questions, or even excluding some questions 
according to the meeting and feel of the conversation with the interviewee. Semi-structured 
interviews also make it possible to add questions and ask follow-up questions to some 
interviewee’s answers. The interviews have been brought out in the manner of one-to-one 
interviews, meaning interviewees can feel fully relaxed and open with their perspective on the 
answers. The interviews were performed individually because of the possibility to be more 
open with reflections during the interview, compared to if the interview would have been 
performed as a panel or group interview (Morgan et al. 2013). Another positive point with 
individual interviews is that more control lies with the person who is performing the 
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interview, whom easily can navigate the conversation after the questions. In a group- or panel 
interview the interviewer may have more problems focusing the questions and answers.  
 
According to Kvale & Brinkmann there are seven ethical issues at different research phases 
that need to be taken into consideration during the interview. Firstly, there is the question 
whether the aim of the interview will bring something to the humanity making it a better 
place, not only the fact that it might be valuable to the research field (Kvale & Brinkmann 
2014: 99). Secondly, there is the issue of keeping the interviewee positive toward the situation 
and maintaining confidentiality (Ibid). Thirdly, there is a need to calculate the consequences 
for the interviewee, which could be stress and a changing self-concept (Ibid). Fourthly, the 
importance of keeping the final text as close to the spoken words as possible in order to 
maintain confidentiality (Ibid). Fifthly, there is the issue of how deeply the interviews should 
be analysed, and whether the interviewee could have any influence of how their statements 
could be analysed (Ibid). Sixthly, verifying the knowledge that is presented during the 
interview in order to have the possibility to ask critical follow-up questions (Ibid: 100). 
Lastly, there is the issue of reporting and publishing the results from the interviews, and what 
could be the consequences for the people interviewed, but also the people that they are 
representing (Ibid). Other ethical issues include the basic ones occurring when interviews are 
conducted; to inform the interviewee about the possibility of being anonymous which often 
leads to a more open interview (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 109-110), to inform about the 
overall ambition of the interview to create trust (Ibid 107-108), inform what the results of the 
interview will entail which gives the interview a meaning (Ibid 110-111), and inform the 
interviewee about the role of the scientist and interviewer to ensure morality and 
professionalism (Ibid 111-112). A reoccurring issue when conducting interviews and 
qualitative research in general is the difficulty of conducting an identical study later, and the 
interviewees are affected by the interviewer’s personality (Bryman & Bell 2013).  
 
The issue of objectiveness is important when it comes to conducting and analysing interviews, 
and according to Kvale and Brinkmann (2014: 291) it is a question whether it is possible or 
not. There are accordingly different sets of objectiveness. Objectivity as in freedom from bias 
is based on reliable research and knowledge that is carefully controlled to limit prejudgements 
to a rather low level (Ibid: 292). Another type of objectiveness is reflexive objectivity which 
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is when researchers reflect about their own contribution to the research area, and aim to be 
objective in relation to the subjectivity. This means that one can only be objective in the sense 
that one always carries preconceptions from previous experiences according to the 
hermeneutical language. To have knowledge of those preconceptions is the key to create 
reliable material and to strive for sensibility when dealing with preconceptions (Ibid: 292). 
Objectivity, as in being adequate to the researched object, means to depict the object in its 
most natural way. One can imagine humans as numbers which will only be told in 
quantitative ways, but one can choose to imagine humans as literate and cultivated creatures 
making the meeting with one feel privileged and informative (Ibid: 293). Objectivity can also 
mean to allowing the object to object which in social science implies to search for the unusual 
and extreme objects, and allowing them to object to the researchers when they feel they are 
not depicted correctly. This creates an environment where the interviewer makes the object 
form the answer (Ibid: 294), as violent extremism has made people react on the actions taken 
to prevent radicalisation occurring. It is important to separate the different concepts of 
objectivity and intersubjectivity, because it is not the same. When something is intersubjective 
it is a shared view of a certain group of people or society, but it is not necessarily a shared 
view with the surrounding people (Ibid: 292-293).  
 
The interviews has been covering questions about their overall point of view of the lecture 
and what could be improved, what they learned from the lecture, and how they are viewing a 
person who is radicalised. The interviewees who are participating in this study have been 
educated in two different groups which means that their main impression of the lecture could 
vary depending on the different circumstances regarding the lecture and group of people etc.. 
The length of every interview was between 30 and 40 minutes and executed either at the 
education centre or in the building of the gaol. The interviews were executed from right after 
the lecture, to up to three weeks after the lecture took place, which means that the prison 
officers could possibly remember the lecture differently. The information that is given at the 
lecture is supposed to be remembered much longer than a couple of weeks so the fact that 
some of the prison officers cannot remember what was being taught at the lecture can be an 
indication of that the structure of the lecture should be changed. Some of the interviewees 
expressed the need for more lecture opportunities, which could be one idea to increase the 
amount of information staying longer. Another idea could be to create a whole day dedicated 
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only to radicalisation and violent extremism, or even a week. There could be people coming 
to be guest lecturer with different experiences from either meeting radical/extremist people or 
actually being one. Another idea is to have a test after the lecture/s to increase the need of 
attention given, and one idea is to move the lecture from the last week before finishing the 
basic training programme, to increase the sense of importance and decrease the feeling of ‘last 
minute solution’. There may be other ways to teach about this issue even, maybe the prison 
officers should be given a written material to read and then be heard about later, or do 
presentations about it, or write a short essay.  
 
 
5.2 Material and selection 
The amount of people who are in the range of being of interest to this study is currently very 
limited. Interesting for the study is to interview about the thoughts and opinions regarding a 
certain part of the training program for prison officers who have gone through the basic 
training. All prison officers have not gone through the basic training but it is more or less a 
condition to accommodate a permanent position. The basic training programme ranges over 
five months, and the certain part that is of most interest for the study is currently covering 90 
minutes. This certain part is of most interest to the study because it is covering violent 
extremism and radicalisation. The program that this part contains is handling the different 
types of violent extremism; right wing-, left wing-, and Islamic extremism. The amount of 
people who fulfilled the criteria for being a part of the study are few, and the amount of 
people of those who fulfilled the criteria and wanted to participate are even fewer, which 
made it difficult to gather enough interviews for the study.  
 
The amount of interviews held was thirteen, and they lasted about thirty to forty minutes each. 
All interviews were audio-recorded and then transcribed, and since all interviews were held in 
Swedish the interviews were translated into English. The interviews started off with basic 
questions regarding their background and current situation in the prison and probation 
services. All interviewees have gone through the six months basic training and as a part of it 
was the lecture about radicalisation and violent extremism. The lecture was held the last week 
of the basic training programme, and after all of the different tests that they have gone 
through to complete the basic training programme. This means that the lecture did not play 
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into the end-result of passing or failing the basic training programme. The interviewees all 
have different backgrounds; some has worked within the prison and probation services for 
years, and some has never had contact with the authority before. The ages range from early 
20’s to mid-50’s, and therefore the participants vary a lot in experience. The interviewees 
were adopted to the basic training programme nationally, but most of them live in 
Gothenburg. 
 
The lecture is put together on behalf of suiting everyone participating, which means being 
informative yet educational to a broad spectrum of people of different levels of knowledge 
and interest. Some of the interviewees have lived largest parts of their lives outside Sweden, 
which sometimes made the language a difficulty. Parts of the interviewees had troubles 
remembering what was being said during the lecture. The interview opportunities ranged from 
right after the lecture to up to three weeks after, which means the interviewees can only try to 
recall in their memory what kind of knowledge they possessed before the education, and not 
know for certain. This caused some of the interviewees to, according to themselves, forget 
details regarding the lecture.  
 
 
5.3 Discursive analysis 
The methodology used in this study is discursive analysis, which is applied in order to analyse 
the results of the interviews. Discursive analysis puts empathy on the language used and how 
people choose to express themselves. The intention is to apply discursive analysis on the 
results of the interviews, to distinguish what is being said in the interviews and what it means 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 272-276).  
 
In discursive analysis, the focus is put on how knowledge and truths are moulded in different 
power situations (Ibid:196). Performing a discursive analysis means to investigate how people 
and groups of people are using expressions and language to create situations and happenings 
(Ibid:197). Things are experienced differently depending on who you ask and what baggage 
that person is already carrying on, which is both the positive and the negative sides of 
discursive analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann 2014: 274). Positive because it brings understanding 
to a person when able to project the thoughts from the interviewee to the reader, and negative 
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because it is not always possible to understand and project thoughts. Discursive analysis 
implies that there are different views to a problem or issue, and the answer will differ 
depending on who is asked. This creates a dilemma for the interviewer to ask enough 
questions to ensure the interviewed gets her/his thoughts through, but without asking too 
many questions which could confuse the interviewee and make him/her rethink the answer. 
 
There are different branches within discursive analysis but the one that will be used for this 
study is the one most often associated with Foucault (1998), and he is still one of the most 
known names connected to discursive analysis. Foucault (1998) suggests that power is used 
when a discourse starts, and is nothing that one can possess. Power is not exercised by or 
towards a subject, but rather developed within relations between people, and means 
limitations to some, and possibilities to others (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 311). Foucault 
(1998) has used discursive analysis to portray the different relations within a prison, and in 
the book Discipline and punish, he shows how the prison staff can be controlled into doing 
what the one in power tells them to do. Foucault (1998) uses positive and negative power 
functions. The positive power function is distinguished by the will to control, mould, monitor 
and normalise, meanwhile the negative power function is distinguished by punishments and 
restrictions (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 330).  
 
Foucault (1998) addresses discursive truth effects, which can be interpreted as discourses can 
show what is true meanwhile setting the limitations to what is conceivable. According to 
Foucault (1998) there are different procedures that can both disconnect and engage a 
conversation; who is allowed to speak and on what terms? More general in terms of making 
discursive analysis more applicable is to see it as boundaries on what is conceivable 
(Börjesson & Palmblad 2007).  
 
Discourse analysis can be used on different texts in order to find out how a point of view is 
changing over time and what kind of preconditions there are, and how they are changing. The 
approach can also be used to find structures in discourses, who they benefit and why. 
Discourse analysis can be used to identify structure of power and disadvantages in relations, 
and also why groups of people are being seen as advantaged and some as disadvantaged. This 
approach can be used to see power relations and how they are being acted upon. When using 
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this approach, it is of importance to always justify the choices made in the process of 
analysing (Bergström & Boréus 2011: 356-357).  
 
Discourse analysis was chosen for this study because of the ability to analyse what is being 
said as well as what is not being said. Interviewees can sometimes feel like they are not able 
to express opinions and thoughts because they may not feel comfortable enough for different 
reasons. That is one reason to why discourse analysis can be a reliable tool to use when 
analysing e.g. texts from interviews, because it is possible to evaluate situation, not only the 
spoken words. When analysing the interviews, moments of silence, hesitation and confusion 
can be taken into the analyse process. Since some of the questions asked are of delicate kind, 
much can be analysed through for example body language and facial expressions. According 
to what Bergström and Boréus (2011:358) are suggesting, the interviews have been closely 
read multiple times. The interviewees’ general and precise mood and the character and feeling 
in the room throughout the interview had been noticed during the interview which has been 
helpful when writing the analysis. After reading the interviews closely they have been divided 
into different categories, adding similar answers together to get a more broad perspective of 
how the general views differ from each other. After pairing the answers together, the 
furthermost opinions work as comparison to the most delicate answer on the opposite side of 
opinions. This demonstrates the different answers meanwhile highlighting the sometimes 
unexpected differences of the answers in the analysis.  
 
The answers given on the questions have been closely read and scrutinised several times, 
according to how Bergström and Boréus (2011) and Kvale and Brinkmann (2014) would 
suggest using discursive analysis. The interviews have been carefully evaluated when 
choosing the most accurate translation, a later analysed again and trying to hear what the 
interviewees are telling.  
 
Here is how the discursive analysis has proceeded: Firstly, a thorough briefing of the current 
situation regarding the basic training programme and the violent extremism and radicalisation 
lecture, and the author also went to two of the lectures to get a better overview of the learning 
material and to be more prepared of the outcome. Secondly, the interview guideline was 
created based on the material gotten from the lecture. Thirdly, the thirteen interviews were 
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held and recorded, which took several months. The interviews were later transcribed into 
written text, and the quotes used for the thesis were translated carefully. Fourthly, the texts 
were prepared to be analysed, by marking important words used and coded into similar 
answers, important points, word groups and the atmosphere during the interview. Fifthly, the 
information was interpreted and analysed, taking all of the above steps into consideration. 
Lastly, the results are presented in the chapter ‘Analysis and results’. 
 
 
5.4 Validity & Reliability 
Validity is described as “the method of measuring is valid if it is measuring what it is 
meaning to measure” (Rosing 1996: 100). In other words; good validity is when you are 
measuring what you intend to measure. Good validity does not necessary mean good research 
(Bergström & Boréus 2011: 35), but it is a necessary mean to reach good research. High 
reliability is when the measure is trustworthy. When using both validity and reliability, the 
goal is to achieve as high validity and reliability as possible. The two measures do not assure 
each other; high reliability does not guarantee high validity, but high validity presumes high 
reliability. One way to ensure high reliability for the study is to document the steps taken in 
the analysis, in order for the reader to be able to redo to study in another time if wanted 
(Bergström & Boréus 2011: 352-353).  
 
In order to make sure that this study is measuring accordingly to the research questions that 
are asked, research about the current issue of radicalisation and violent extremism has been 
thoroughly studied, and information regarding the institutions of prison and probation services 
has been closely studied. The latter information was gathered mostly by having a position at 
the prison and probation services in Gothenburg, and being able to search through their 
intranet for information.  
 
 
5.5 Ethics 
All of the interviewees were told about the possibility to be anonymous, which could make 
them more open regarding their opinions about the lecture and basic training programme, and 
they all agreed to participate in the interviews if they could be anonymous.  
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According to Vetenskapsrådet there are a couple of points that are important when conducting 
research generally. Conducting research with humans, research misconduct is an important 
factor and includes honest results and misconduct of any kind. Honest results because it is 
never allowed to scramble, make false, mislead or plagiarise results of any kind. Dishonest 
results are considered research misconduct and could lead to unnecessary risks. This is why 
all research should be translucent and open about how the research has been conducted, to 
make possible for other researchers to control and repeat the research. Not until the research is 
redone with similar results is the research scientifically accepted (vr.se 2017).  
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6. Analysis and results 
This chapter contains the findings of the study. The analysis has been structured into different 
sections according to each research question. The first research question focuses on how 
much the prison officers knew before entering the lecture provided by the prison and 
probation services, and what they know afterwards. The second question asks how the prison 
officers identify people in the radicalisation process and those who are violent extremists. The 
third research question will ask how the prison officers imagine violent extremists and 
radicalised persons looks, behaviour, age, gender and what target group they belong to, etc. 
The answers are chosen due to what they answered, but all interviewees’ answers are 
represented at least once.  
 
In order for the Swedish prison and probation services to be able to deliver what they have 
undertaken by the government, the lecture that is provided to the prison officers elected for 
the basic training programme must be effective and offer the prison officers what they need to 
know about radicalisation and violent extremism as Kriminalvården (2015) and 
Kriminalvården (2016) are suggesting.  
 
 
6.1 Knowledge in the area 
News and media are constantly providing information about threats of terror, and 
remembering terrorism by year has become huge and numerous documentaries have been 
made. It has become impossible not to know something about the radicalisation and violent 
extremist wave that hit Europe the last years. Having this information in regards, the 
interviewees’ were all asked what they knew about the subject before coming to the lecture. 
The question asked to the interviewees was: What did you as prison officer know before and 
what did you learn from the lecture about violent extremism and radicalisation? 
 
Interviewee #1: I learned that it exists both on the left and right sides of politics, but also 
religious groups and other groups. It is not only tied to Islam which media often makes it seem 
like. Of course I knew that before, but it is easy to forget when it is only Islamic extremism 
that is shown in media all the time. So that is what I learned from the lecture. And also the 
signs that the lecturer showed at the lecture were new to me, I had not seen the left wing signs 
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before.. The ones with the arrow and AFA I had heard of but I did not know what they stood 
for.  
 
Interviewee number one talks about the fact that radicalisation exists both politically and 
religiously, something that the interviewee is fast to point out was already to his/her 
knowledge. This is important to mention because media always focus on the religious and 
Islamic extremism, and rarely mention political radicalisation. This can be seen as a way that 
Islamic extremism has been stereotyped into being the only extremism, according to how this 
interviewee experiences the media reports. As Ragazzi (2017) discusses, categorisation of a 
type of extremism can lead to missing out other signs about extremism that might come from 
clients that are not the ‘right fit’ according to that category. The lecture has, therefore, been a 
positive experience for this interviewee, since it has opened the presumptions of what a 
violent extremist can be and might have contributed to a less categorised view of violent 
extremists. Meanwhile the interviewee categorises less, he/she also learned that there are 
signs that the different extremist groups are using, which are totally opposing consequences of 
the education and therefore it is difficult to interpret what the aftermath is for this interviewee.  
 
Interviewee number nine explained that he/she got information from research and experts. 
These experts he/she talked about have to some extent also been a source for this study. 
 
  Interviewee #9: It was nothing new to me. I do find it peculiar that such little focus is being 
put on the subject, because there is always the right wing-extremism with bombs and all, and 
now ISIS is very current. One of the colleagues in the programme speaks Arabic, and while 
she was visiting a detention here in Gothenburg she observed recruitment to ISIS going on 
openly in Arabic. The other prison officers had no idea about this, but she heard it in the way 
they talked to each other. They searched the living space and sure enough they found material 
that supported ISIS. Open recruitment to fighting units in a Swedish detention! 
 
Interviewee number nine is interested in the area of radicalisation and violent extremism, 
which is why he/she goes to the lengths of reading research about it, and the lecture gave 
nothing new, because of that. When people are taught things that they already know or have 
heard of before, it creates distrust to the authority or company, as shown in the study made by 
Useem and Clayton (2009). The students need to feel like they are gaining some sort of 
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information, in order to make the lecture interesting. On the contrary, Mäkitalo (2012) writes 
about the importance of information and education from authorities who in turn would mean 
that regardless of what the prison officers have heard before, the education provided from the 
prison and probation service is more important than previously given information. As noted in 
the interview; it is much appreciated to have different language skills when working in the 
prison and probation services. Interviewee number nine learned that recruitment to terror 
organisations can take place in different ways which underlines the importance of Jones 
(2014) research about prisons being “schools of terror”.  
 
In contrast to interviewee number nine is number five and eleven, both uncertain on what they 
knew before and what was being taught during the lecture. Especially interviewee number 
eleven cannot remember anything that was being told during the lecture, but still is certain 
he/she knew it all from before.  
 
Interviewee #5: I do not remember what we talked about... During the basic training 
programme there was so much information constantly. I know that we talked about political 
and religious extremism and radicalisation, but I cannot remember more than that. I know only 
what is being said on the news since I am not familiar with it at all. It was a condensed lecture 
of some 60 or 90 minutes, I believe we touched upon religious extremism but I cannot say 
more than that.  
 
Interviewee #11: He talked about things that I already knew about. It is a lot in the news and 
media so I did not get affected because I already knew the things that he talked about. It was 
interesting, and he seems to know what he is talking about. But since I knew it all from earlier 
I cannot say what I learned from the lecture. I do not remember what we talked about 
unfortunately. It was about symbols and such, flags and signs. Do not know what it stands for.  
 
Interviewees five and eleven are both very insecure of what they learned. They do not 
remember what the lecturer talked about and seem both quite uninterested to find out. To 
compare this kind of sloppiness to the research made by Johnston (2008) is interesting since 
he noticed a change when he put more pressure on the prison officers. The prison officers 
were supposed to stay updated about news within the criminal gangs and study on their spare 
time, to stay on top of what is going on at the prison you are working at. When questioning 
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interviewees number five and eleven (and some of the others too) they answer the questions 
half-heartedly and with lack of interest. If it spread to clients that some of the prison officers 
do not know how to handle certain situations they could choose to take advantage of that. A 
knowledge test after the lecture about radicalisation and violent extremism should be 
considered to make the prison officers more attentive and according to Johnston (2008) some 
pressure could be helpful when it comes to remembering important information.   
 
Interviewee number six is next, and he/she answers very differently compared to the previous 
answers. This interviewee seems to have learned a lot from the lecture, and is very positive 
about the experience meanwhile aware of the difficulties of detecting something hidden.  
 
Interviewee #6: I learned how the prison and probation services in Sweden looks at 
radicalisation, how we are supposed to act, but I am still not sure. It is positive that we are 
starting to think about this and how we can prevent it from happening. It is very positive. I 
work at a class-two prison facility, and what I learned about radicalisation and the symptoms 
of it is when someone speaks openly about supporting those kinds of organisations. We were 
shown flags, letters and books that can be encrypted, mostly you can ask for help from a 
colleague to translate it for you. But I think it is easy to hide it if you want to, meanwhile some 
people show openly that they are extremists. 
 
Interviewee number six is encouraged to engage in the relations with the prisoners, which can 
be supported and strengthened by Johnston (2008). There are influences coming from the 
prison officers that are invaluable because often the prison officers are the only influences at 
all that some of the prisoners get from the outside world. The life within the walls of the 
prison can seem lonely and it is easy to find “bad” kind of influences from other prisoners, 
which is why it is important that the prison officers believe they can and should make a 
difference for the prisoners that they meet. As Jones remarks the quality of the education 
given to the prison officers are of importance, because it is easy for clients to find influences 
which can be discovered if they are trained properly (2014).  
 
The interviewees have in general a distinct opinion about their previous knowledge in the area 
to be at approximately the same level before as after the lecture. It seems to be predominantly 
news and media that is being held as the source of information for most parts. To have prison 
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officers informed and interested to that degree is not common, but seven out of the thirteen 
interviewees answered that they had the same information before as after the lecture. Many of 
the interviewees also had troubles remembering what was being talked about on the lecture. 
The interviewee who is interested in the subject is also indifferent to the outcome of the 
lecture, due to the large amount of knowledge that was already gathered about the issue. 
When summarising the information gathered by analysing the first research question, the 
prison officers remarks they have learned that there are different types of extremism, and “not 
only Islamic extremism”, which is a stereotype that many prison officers had previously to the 
lecture. Moscovici (2000) continuingly points out the importance of not getting stuck in 
stereotypes and categories, which is another point in why education in this subject is well 
needed for prison officers. Being more open minded about who can be in the radicalisation 
process, would mean that fewer clients would be subject to stereotyping and hopefully make 
the time clients spend imprisoned more valuable.  
 
Seven out of thirteen interviewees either have trouble remembering what they were taught or 
they claim they did not learn much, more than half of the group interviewed either did not 
learn anything about violent extremism or they do not remember anything from the lecture. 
Many of the interviewees who say they do not remember what they were taught suggested 
more and longer sessions on this subject. More time spend on the subject would, according to 
the prison officers, naturally give them a better remembrance of the lecture and they would be 
more likely to detect signs of violent extremism or radicalisation. Another recurrent issue is 
that some of the interviewees already had knowledge regarding what was being taught. When 
these people are asked what they knew from before the lecture they often answer that they did 
not know much, but simultaneously did not learn anything either. By using Moscovici on both 
of the groups mentioned, it is obvious that the education is of high importance. Moscovici 
(2000) mean that you cannot learn anything about representations from spending time alone, 
and these stereotypes can only be broken when challenging them. The interviewees mention 
media as their main source of information, meanwhile many of the interviewees say they only 
knew about Islamic violent extremism, and not about the left- and right wing violent 
extremism, assumingly media is portraying Islamic violent extremism and not the others, 
which shows that a wider perspective on the possible perpetrator is needed. By giving the 
prison officers more information about the different kinds of violent extremism, the 
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representations and stereotypes can be questioned. It could be argued with help from Mäkitalo 
(2012) that education in this area is important only based on the fact that it comes from an 
authority. In this case, the education gives prison officers a base to start from when suspicion 
arises regarding a possible radicalised or violent extremist person.  
 
 
6.2 Stereotyping the radicalisation process 
This question was certainly interesting to ask the interviewees, because they all paused and 
seemed to contemplate how to answer this question. Due to the much attention given lately to 
radicalisation and terrorist attacks all over the world, this topic is certainly sensitive and easy 
to misunderstand. The question asked was: How do you as a prison officer, identify 
“radicalised” and violent extremist persons?  
 
A common answer to this question is reflected in the answers by interviewee number four and 
twelve. Media is easily contributing to the depiction of violent extremists.  
 
Interviewee #4: Well yes you do get affected by media, which makes you think of an Arab 
with a big beard running around with dynamite under his jacket. That is what I think of when I 
hear about terrorist attacks.  
 
Interviewee #12: It depends on what group you mean... My first thought is that I exclude the 
left wing extremists since I do not know anything about them. The right wing extremists have 
become more present lately but to my knowledge they are working more in the shadows, it is 
hard to grasp them. So I am going for the Islamic extremist group.. I am thinking of a young 
guy, up to thirty years old, whom lacks a meaning in life, he also lacks both an education and a 
job, and he has been unemployed for a while. He might be a Muslim. He appears open about 
his views in his circle, but hides them from the rest of the society. I think they shake it off, the 
circle. He is tired of life, feels left outside the society, cannot afford to buy an apartment, the 
line for a rental apartment is like 10 years, what should he do... He is probably pretty innocent 
otherwise. I am visioning him in the suburbs where he cannot find any role models. The 
people in the mosque became his idols and he gets manipulated to want a change. It is hard to 
find them to make it better.  
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Interviewees number four and twelve are acting out what is portrayed in media and news 
constantly, without questioning the reality or facts of it. Another interpretation is that the 
interviewees are answering the way that others would answer if there were no audio-recording 
devices, which are only pure speculations though. They are both answering quite uncensored 
compared to the other interviewees, which could be interpreted as they both forgot about the 
audio-recording and wandered astray with their thoughts. They are both answering some other 
questions with the same kind of certainty, which makes their credibility lower because they 
make the complex questions sound easy and unproblematic. The research made by Thomas 
(2015) showed that the walls between the clients and the prison officers would surprisingly 
increase after an educational or resource focus. This means that education can increase the 
differences and creates what is unwanted, namely division between parties. Thomas (2015) 
claims that the desire for supervision by authorities creates wedges between them and the 
other part, which is what could have happened between these two interviewees and Muslim 
clients. This is a classical way stereotyping and social constructions (Moscovici 2000) are 
creating bigger differences appear than what exist. Social construction work as a magnet 
board where the memory tries to connect different features with actions, which in this case for 
interviewees four and twelve couples religion or heritage with social distress and violence, 
and even terror.  
 
Interviewee number eight seems to be aware of stereotypes, but still applicate them on to 
reality.  
 
Interviewee #8: Something that I was told during the lecture and programme is that the 
radicalised people are often strict about how they appear. And they are together a very strong 
coherent group and they stand up and support each other to 100%. They are often extreme in 
their behaviour overall. And all we can do when we acknowledge someone who is acting like 
this is to note it down, it is tricky. There is no mould that shows how a radicalised person will 
act or look like, but I think they act extreme regardless if it is politically or religiously. I have 
heard that there in some prisons are men who do not shake women’s hands, do not eat certain 
things, cannot sit next to many people, and in those cases you can tell they are extreme.  
 
Interviewee number eight tries to wrap the answer in a soft blanket by saying there are ways 
to find out if someone is extreme or not by observe them and see if they are acting in a way 
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considered extreme in any way. The interviewee is asking for a mould or a description of how 
an extremist looks and acts like, which is exactly the point that Christiansen (2017) put 
forward with the research on the differences between Swedish and Danish prison and 
probation services. Christiansen (2017) found that there is more action in terms of educational 
material and action plans on the south side of the Öresund since the Swedish prison and 
probation service seem to be having problems with deciding what action plan to follow. The 
‘mould’ that the interviewee is asking for would possibly be a way to undermine stereotypes 
and create more wedges between people that are unfamiliar to us. Research made by 
Rappaport, Veldhuis and Guiora (2012) says that the attention should be shifted from 
searching for signs of radicalisation, to educating the prison officers in religious values. 
According to the study (Rappaport, Veldhuis and Guiora 2012) it is important to see prisoners 
as individuals rather than a part of a large group if the goal is to keep the level of violent 
extremism down. The more attention given to the individual the more likely it is that 
individual will be encouraged to change course of life. This interviewee is using a classical 
way to categorise (Mäkitalo 2012) radicalised persons, because the prison officer has never 
met a radicalised person, but still has opinions and knowledge about these people.  
 
Interviewee number two is next, and he/she thinks long and hard before answering the 
questions, and appears careful with the words chosen. 
 
Interviewee #2: That is a very hard question! To me, it is a person who chooses to execute.. I 
do not know how to explain it, but in terms of tattoos and symbols. But I cannot look at a 
person and tell him or her: you are like this! I cannot assign someone as a certain type of 
person or group. I could guess but I would not know. --- I do not see people like that. I know 
that society judge people after their appearance, for example a middle east person with a lot of 
beard are perceived in one way, and a very Swedish looking person in another way.. I think 
the society often judge after appearance. But since I have met so many people in my previous 
job with the forensic psychiatry, I know that it is impossible to predict a person’s beliefs and 
what he or she sympathises with based on that persons looks. I have never judged a person by 
its cover. No. 
 
This interviewee is very particular in letting us know that there are no groups of people that 
can be treated the same way, only individuals that need special treatment separately. This 
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interviewee prefers to view people on an individual level, meaning that the categorisation and 
representation probably looks different from the group of people that otherwise are 
categorised as violent extremists and terrorists. This prison officer analyse violent extremists 
and radicalised persons individually, and claims society to judge them according to 
appearance, which is exactly what Moscovici (1976) also means. Moscovici says that all 
people connect certain behaviour and appearance with social representations, depending on 
what the individuals have experienced and been told through life.  
 
Next is interviewee number thirteen, using ‘correct’ language and expressions, and he/she 
make clear to the interviewer that there is no ‘type’ of violent extremist, but instead it can be 
anyone.  
 
Interviewee #13: It is hard. I think it comes back to preconceived notions. If you take for 
instance Islamic extremism almost everyone has the preconceived notion about it which also 
can be interpreted as racist, in other words it is a foreign man between 20 to 25 years old, big 
beard, pretty dark-skinned, and I think that is the basic presumption that for any Swede but 
that is really wrong because he do not necessarily look like that. It is the same with right wing 
extremists, peoples preconceived notion is that they are the same age but with as skinhead, 
bomber jacket and leather boots. But it can be a 45 year old dad whom lives the world’s best 
life in a detached area, but really he has swastikas tattooed on his legs. It is more to people 
than what meets the eye. So my answer to the question is that it is really hard to say since it 
can be anyone.  
 
Person number thirteen is in the same way as number two very delicate when choosing words 
while expressing his thoughts. This interviewee is aware of the stereotypes that people have 
regarding violent extremists. In the same way as interviewee number two, interviewee number 
thirteen also believe society judges people after their appearance, but does not do it 
him/herself. Interviewee number thirteen says that even when the appearance of a person tells 
you how he or she will behave, this is when stereotypes should be ignored. Referring to 
previous experience, interviewee number thirteen tells about great people supporting violent 
extremism, and people that are thought of being violent extremists being innocent of that kind 
of support. This means that categorisation can go both ways, as Ragazzi also points out 
(2017). It is easy to find characteristic traits when you know where to look for them. This can 
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be more strongly reinforced by examine the way they use the words, and superlatives are 
frequently used which can be analysed as assurance in the extreme which implies the 
opposite. In this answer, the prison officer automatically knows that there are wrong answers, 
and carefully tries to find a way to answer correctly. This interviewee prefers to view people 
as individuals who all have different stories and fates constructing their life.  
 
Interviewee number three answers this question trying to show no signs of preconceptions, 
but do show hints of hidden preconceived notions.  
 
Interviewee #3: That is a hard question... What we have gone through has been some religious 
ways of expression or properties, but strictly superficial I do not find a huge difference 
between how the religious expressions would be without radicalisation. Possibly it would be 
taken a notch further, be more direct. Meanwhile, when thinking of the political expressions, 
one can look for tattoos and graffiti, and of course greetings and gestures.   
 
Using categories, this prison officer believe that e.g. tattoos should be present on political 
extremists, who can both include people who wear tattoos but does not sympathise with those 
opinions, meanwhile it can exclude people who does not wear tattoos but agree with the 
opinions (Ragazzi 2017). This is problematic because it strengthens stereotypes and could 
mean that people in the radicalisation process are not detected due to an improper, according 
to the prison officer, identity of the radicalised person. This is a way to categorise violent 
extremists as a part of society where most people have little insight. To give the unfamiliar 
and, as it is portrayed, dangerous part of society certain attributes create an illusion of a 
relation, which makes it easier to categorise and separate from (Moscovici 2000).  
 
Next interviewee puts more emphasis on the behaviour of the client rather than looks, and has 
preconceptions about the age of violent extremists. The stereotype about age is, according to 
Swedish prison and probation services, correct in the case of political violent extremists, but 
Islamic violent extremists are often older than expected (Kriminalvården 2015:7). 
 
Interviewee #7: I think a lot about behaviour, expressions that change quickly, maybe copy 
others opinions which make the client unrecognisable anymore. I believe younger clients can 
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be more receptive and predisposed to radicalisation, vulnerable persons who lack a sense of 
belonging maybe. It is very hard to say.     
 
Interviewee number seven imagines the behaviour to be shifting from one way to another. 
That might be a way of viewing violent extremism and radicalised persons a bit too soft. That 
these people would be “younger clients” is not totally correct according to the mission given 
to the Swedish prison and probation service (Kriminalvården 2015) by the government. This 
prison officer is using a way of categorising, as Moscovici would say. By believing 
radicalisation and violent extremism mostly occur to young clients whom are “vulnerable 
persons who lack a sense of belonging” is a way for the prison officer to make this problem 
more tangible and less obscure. This interviewee is 35+ years old and is actually around the 
same age as most violent extremists are when getting in contact with prison and probation 
services in this matter. This means that this interviewee has created a misleading fact about 
violent extremists, to create a barrier between ‘them and us’.  
 
Interviewee number ten is sceptical about identifying a person who is violent extremist or in 
the radicalisation process, and doubt it would be possible to discover signs if they are hidden. 
This is a realistic view of the problem, but not an excuse not to work towards finding more 
ways to identify some of these people.  
 
Interviewee #10: I do not know... It depends on how they behave, and move. I do not know 
how to... It is hard to say in my profession, it all depends on how much you get to meet the 
person. I am working at the transportation unit, which means I only meet a client for 
maximum four hours at the time, and sometimes they do not even want to talk. And I am never 
inside a prison room. I do not think it is possible to tell from appearance. There are so many 
different kinds of people. It is really hard to say. It could be if they have very extreme 
opinions, but I doubt they want to share those thoughts with anyone. It is hard to know in my 
position, if I am not participating in the courtroom, but that is only after something has 
happened.  
 
For interviewee number ten it is hard to say what causes these opinions, and also what 
behaviours it might occur. Extreme opinions are not problematic until they are taken into 
action (Porter & Kebbell 2011), but in this case the prison officer might not be open to detect 
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signs of violent extremism and radicalisation. It is important to remember what Kundnani 
(2014) discusses, that the problematizing of violent extremism can both solve and hurt the 
process of ending it, but that does not include ignoring signs that are obvious.  
 
Next interviewee is interested in the subject of violent extremism, and therefore has more 
knowledge than most people, which is of importance to acknowledge when reading the 
following answer. 
 
Interviewee #9: I would pay attention to the small details. There are probably very 
many different types of radicalisation. There have been some Nazis who were 
extremely hidden, who would never wear symbols or express thoughts openly. There 
was a diffusive Nazi group within the police in Stockholm during the 1980’s who 
performed horrible deeds, but never expressed it openly. It is different with people who 
openly express his/her opinion; it is very easy to identify them. The few Islamic violent 
extremists that I have met have been very strict with the diet, they have been 
absolutist… The ones that I have met have also been very well-read; I have looked 
everything up after the meetings and it all have been correct. Sometimes it is claimed 
that they are incompetent, but that has not been the case for me. Nazis that I have 
conversed with are often not that knowledgeable. That is very different. It is a too 
complex question. I would not hesitate to report a so called hidden extremist if I suspect 
it. The ones who are really spiteful are not very expressive about their opinions. The 
ones that I know who have travelled to Syria have not been extreme before they leave 
either, they have just suddenly left without anyone having suspicions about it. The 
dangerous extremists are not noticed before they leave. I worked with a schmuck a 
while back during a hearing whom had SS tattooed over half his face and a swastika on 
his chest, and also he was a poly-drug abuser, he was not dangerous in that way since 
his sympathies are clear. Of course it is extreme to tattoo SS in the face, but I think that 
tells more about that person’s intellectual status than anything else.  
 
Interviewee number nine stresses the importance of being aware of the different types of 
violent extremism. This interviewee draws stories and conclusions from own experiences 
when meeting extremists as a prison officer, and it is noticeable that he/she has been 
analysing this topic before. Even with the knowledge and experience from many clients of 
different extremist backgrounds, this interviewee still categorises right-wing extremists as 
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‘not that knowledgeable’ and Islamic extremists as ‘well-read’ in the subject that they 
represent. This means that according to interviewee number nine, the extremist encounters 
that he/she has had, mostly have been presented as the categorisation of right-wing extremists 
as ‘schmucks’ with low intellectual status, and Islamic extremists as ‘absolutists’ who are 
competent in the subject. This connect well with Mäkitalo (2012) where she discuss that we 
identify someone we have once met with a category of people, and that category is stuck until 
we meet someone new who fit into that category, hence the category is transforming over 
time, slowly. Moscovici (2000) also means that we need to create categories for people in 
order for us to know how to interact with them, in this case interviewee number nine acts and 
talks in different ways depending on what the previous experiences have been with the same 
category of people.   
 
Interviewee number six uses categorisation alike previous interviewee, but the difference is 
that this interviewee uses television and media as references, instead of personal encounters. 
 
Interviewee #6: It… Often when we see on telly or movies they have big beards, and 
belong to a church or religion. But I really believe that there are many individuals who 
are completely normal, but might have those thoughts, hidden from the eye. If I meet a 
person with a big beard and darker skin and looks like a typical terrorist as they show 
on telly, it does not mean that person is like that. It is a hard question.  
 
It is problematic that interviewee number six refers to media as reference point for this 
stereotype, even though he/she informs the interviewer about it being inappropriate. This can 
be portrayed as figurative social representation according to Moscovici (2011). It means that 
the group which is stereotyped is shaped by what society expects from the class, ethnicity, 
gender and ultimately categorises are expecting from that specific representation. The 
individuals within these representations become equal to the group they are representing, no 
matter how little in common the individual have with the group in general. This creates a 
wedge between the minorities (in this case violent extremists inside prisons) and the prison 
officers, and is the opposite of what is wanted.  
 
This research question was interesting to investigate. Many of the interviewees had ideas of 
identifying violent extremism and radicalisation through observing the clients behaviours. 
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Changing territorial areas, new groups of people, attitudinal changes, growing a beard and 
becoming more religious and extreme in their food habits were some of the recurring actions 
to observe, according to the prison officers. Many of the interviewees were surprised by the 
question ‘how can a violent extremist person be identified’, and needed some time before 
answering it. This can be analysed in different ways, but most of the times it happened the 
situation and words spoken was interpreted as a way of reflection and carefully choosing 
‘right’ words for those thoughts. Not as a way to hide a certain opinion but making sure the 
words said would not be misinterpreted.  
 
Eleven of the interviewees were certain that it is impossible to tell just by looking at a person 
if he/she is a violent extremist person, but two of the prison officers were certain on looks and 
identities of extremist persons. These two interviewees answered the question without 
hesitation, saying things including: they have a big beard, wear bombs under their jacket, 
have darker skin, very religious and picky with their food, and all of these attributes fit the 
stereotype for ‘Islamic violent extremist’. This is problematic meanwhile it is small part of the 
interviewees who portrayed violent extremists like this. Applying Moscovici on this implies 
the social representation and categorisation of violent extremism to be crooked and showing 
only one type of person, when the representation should be much larger. Both of these 
interviewees were relatively calm and straight forward with their answers, and did not spend 
much time thinking about the answers. The positive side is that the largest part of the 
interviewees did not have any doubt there was no way to tell by looks if someone is a violent 
extremist. This shows that the education has given the prison officers knowledge regarding 
the different types of violent extremists, and showed the possibility of a broad variety of types 
of clients which all could be exposed to radicalisation. Using discursive analysis on the text in 
the steps explained in chapter 5.3, gave the interviews more depth and increased the 
possibility to understand how the interviewees meant to express themselves, and developed 
the analysis.  
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7. Conclusion and discussion 
The article (Kriminalvården 2017) written about the project of educating and preventing 
radicalisation in Swedish prison and probation services tells: “The work is going well”. This 
is an article posted on the intranet of Swedish prison and probation services, without an 
author, saying that the work of being equipped to follow the directives from the government is 
going well.  
 
This thesis is evaluating thirteen interviews of prison officers on the topic of violent 
extremism and radicalisation. The interviews has been audio-recorded and transcribed, and 
then used to answer the research questions. Then the answers have been translated from 
Swedish to English, and then analysed using discursive analysis.  
 
The aim of this study is to find out how prison officers experience the education regarding 
violent extremism, and how they identify violent extremists and radicalised persons. Two 
research questions have been used in order to find answers to the aim: 
 
1. What did the prison officers know before and what did they learn about radicalisation 
and violent extremism when participating in the education?  
2. How do prison officers identify violent extremist and radicalised persons?  
 
Question number one include background information about what the prison officers knew 
before they entered the lecture about violent extremism and radicalisation, and what they 
learned from the lecture and basic training programme together. Some prison officers 
answered that they knew everything that was being talked about already, and wanted the next 
round of basic training programme to include more and longer sessions, which would result in 
better remembrance from the lecture, also make the prison officers appear more competent to 
the prisoners, according to the prison officers. By comparing the answers on the first question, 
the results show that more than half of the interviewees say they did not learn much or 
anything at all from the lecture. This is bothersome, but since the question was given after the 
lecture took place, it is possible they thought they knew things that they actually did not. Most 
of the interviewees were happy they got information regarding the three different types of 
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violent extremism, because a majority of them said during the interview they mainly thought 
about Islamic extremism, forgetting about the political extremism.  
 
Question number two tells a lot about if prison officers’ use preconceptions in their work, and 
how they identify violent extremists and radicalised persons according to it. Eleven of the 
thirteen interviewees said it is impossible to tell by appearance whether or not a person is a 
violent extremist, which is positive for the future of prison and probations in Sweden. This 
means that either the education has taught them the different types of violent extremism and 
therefore the variety of people being possible violent extremist and radicalised persons, or 
they knew this before the education. Either way, it is positive the amount of stereotyping, 
categorising and social representation among prison officers is keeping a low number. The 
theoretical framework of categorising and representation worked to find the different ways 
prison officers might use stereotypes in order to identify violent extremists and radicalised 
persons. Moscovici theory helped the analysis to find the problems of categorising and 
representation, and concluded it was used by two of the thirteen interviewees.  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis is that this is a complex issue that needs 
to be dealt with in order for it to stop. Much of the previous research show that the education 
of prison officers is of big importance for the clients and their environment inside prisons. 
The fact that prisoners become radicalised during their visit to prisons, make the issue of large 
importance to the Swedish prison and probation services. In Gothenburg this issue is dealt 
with by having a 90 minute lecture for the new prison officers. Considering the lecture of 
violent extremism and radicalisation to be fairly new in Gothenburg, the results should be 
seen as positive, especially the answers on research question number two, where the 
considerable majority answered satisfactory.  
 
Problems that have occurred during the process of this study have first and foremost been to 
find prison officers who are qualified and willing to participate in an interview. It has been 
quite difficult. Other problems have been to find previous research that matches with the topic 
of educating prison officers, which is why chapter on previous research might be a little 
shorter than usual.  
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The generality of the findings are a little insecure since there were only thirteen prison 
officers that were interviewed. Meanwhile there have not been more than a total of 40 prison 
officers finishing the basic training programme under the time frame from when the mission 
was taken on from the Swedish government. This means that thirteen are quite many from a 
small group of 40, and the generality is adequate. The interviews have been performed in 
Gothenburg and not considered any other of the educational locations as Stockholm, Malmö, 
Örebro and Norrköping, which might affect the generality as well.  
 
The research gap that was talked about in the introduction has partly been filled. There should 
be much more research in the area before the gap is filled. It would be of interest to perform 
this study again after a potential change is made. Depending on what change is performed the 
result of the prison officers knowledge about radicalisation and their preconceptions about 
who becomes radicalised, it would be very interesting to see the possible change. If there are 
still people who forgets and appears uninterested to the issue of radicalisation and violent 
extremism there must be further change in the lecture structure.  
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9. Appendix 
Interview guideline 
1. What is your background? Have you done any studying or work previously?  
2. What is your age? 
3. For how long have you been in the prison and probation services? 
4. Have you gone through any kind of education within the prison and probation services 
(apart from the basic training programme)? 
5. Did any part of the basic training programme stand out from the rest? 
6. Have you been affected by the lecture? How? 
7. What is your general impression from the lecture? 
8. What concepts were you informed of on the lecture? 
9. What did you know about radicalisation and violent extremism before the lecture? 
10. What did you learn about radicalisation and violent extremism? 
11. Have you been working towards radicalisation and violent extremism at work? 
12. Do you have knowledge about what to search for in regards to finding signs of 
radicalisation before and after the lecture? 
13. Do you know what to search for regarding radicalisation processes? 
14. What have you learned to be attentive to? 
15. How have you learned to identify radicalisation? 
16. Have the lecture affected your everyday work life in any way? 
17. How have the lecture affected your understanding of radicalisation? 
18. How are you working with the issues radicalisation and violent extremism today? 
19. How do you identify a person who is in the radicalisation process? How do you 
imagine the looks, behaviour, age, gender, target group?  
20. How do you think the lecture has affected your opinion regarding the previous 
question? 
21. What is the most important thing you learned from the lecture? 
22. What is the most important thing you learned from the basic training programme? 
23. Have the terror attack in Stockholm, with the truck, affected you in any way? (This 
question was added after the attack occurred, because one of the interviewees 
mentioned it and it felt appropriate to add to the interview guideline). 
